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In the first half of the twentieth century there was a remarkable convergence of art 
and design in De Stijl, Constructivism and the Bauhaus. Via such movements art was 
able to develop beyond the l’art pour l’art aestheticism of nineteenth century 
romanticism and postromanticism and enter into the praxis of life. But in the second 
half of the twentieth century fine art relinquished its liaison with architecture and 
design.  
We find an explanation for this development in Peter Bürger’s Theory of the 
Avant-Garde1 which informs us that Dada and Surrealism also pursued a 
reconciliation of art with everyday life but according to an entirely different 
philosophy. Bürger’s analysis is valuable because he is one of the first theorists to 
indicate that Dada and Surrealism laid the foundation for postmodern fine art in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Accordingly his analysis can assist in 
understanding why postmodern fine art turned away from design and architecture. 
The following passage from Bürger’s analysis, in particular, provides considerable 
insight: 
It is no accident that both Tzara's instructions for the making of a Dadaist 
poem and Breton's for the writing of automatic texts have the character of 
recipes. This represents not only a polemical attack on the individual creativity 
of the artist; the recipe is to be taken quite literally as suggesting a possible 
activity on the part of the recipient. The automatic texts also should be read as 
guides to individual production. But such production is not to be understood as 
artistic production, but as part of a liberating life praxis. This is what is meant 
by Breton's demand that poetry be practiced (pratiquer la poesie).2  
 
Bürger argues that the methodologies developed by Dada and Surrealism entail 
interactivity. But this is not the case because it is the notion of bringing poetry into 
everyday life that is fundamental, not the notion of interactivity. The notion of 
bringing poetry into everyday life is quintessentially romantic. And in order to 
comprehend this idea we have to identify the most basic premises of romanticism 
which are: first, the creativity of the unconscious mind; and, second, the aesthetics of 
the sublime and its relationship with the noumenal. Theoretically anyone could create 
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a readymade work of art in the manner of Marcel Duchamp. Anyone could create a 
cut and paste photomontage or an automatic painting. In practice, however, the only 
people who do this are fine artists. The reason why the techniques developed by Dada 
and Surrealism remain the preserve of fine artists is because they are located within a 
romantic or postromantic philosophy that is intrinsically antithetical to commonsense 
and practical-functionalism. 
This prejudice is informed by the romantic concept of nature. Beginning with 
Rousseau romanticism asserts a binary opposition between nature and society in 
which the first term is characterised as joyful, anarchic and positive and the second as 
resentful, hierarchical and negative.3 In German romantic philosophy this distinction 
evolves into an antagonism towards the modern philosophy of utilitarianism.4 And in 
the postromantic thought of Friedrich Nietzsche utilitarianism is contrasted with the 
intoxication and frenzy (Rausch) of artistic creation that stems from the unbounded 
creativity of the unconscious (“active”) mind conceived as a state of nature.5 The 
antagonism towards the rationalism of modern society evident in postromantic 
movements such as Dada and Surrealism, Situationism, and most recently “relational 
aesthetics”6 help explain why they have consistently failed to bring art into life.7  
The convergence of art and design in De Stijl, Constructivism and the 
Bauhaus, in contrast, provided an avenue for bringing art into life in a manner that did 
not entail a romantic/postromantic antagonism towards rational functionalism. Such 
movements were able to create an elegant visual poetics capable of reconciling 
sublimity with functionality and reaching into everyday life via architecture and 
design. But in order to achieve this end their aesthetic framework intersected with the 
dominant discourse of technoscientific rationalism. In contrast Dada and Surrealism, 
the movements that found postmodern art, are radically antirationalist. Crucial to their 
aesthetics is the romantic premise that creativity is located in the unconscious mind 
conceived as a psychic state of nature.  
We find ourselves therefore caught between a thesis and antithesis that awaits 
an effective synthesis. The thesis is the dominant social discourse of functionalism 
and the antithesis is the romantic/postromantic demand for a sublime poetics to be 
brought into everyday life. One way of overcoming this opposition is to examine 
those aspects of postromantic aesthetics that take the pathway of mythologising the 
creativity of nature via evolution. Following this route we uncover fundamental 
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weaknesses in the postromantic position that can help in adumbrating a potential 
synthesis.  
When we examine the response to Darwinian evolution in Nietzsche and 
Henri Bergson we discover a romanticist longing for the sacred that was lost when 
Christianity ceased to be a binding force in European society. For postromantic 
philosophy evolution offers an alternative source of the sacred in the form of the 
creative forces of nature. This is evident when evolution is figured by Nietzsche in 
terms of a mysterious “form shaping force”;8 by Bergson in terms of a “universal vital 
impulsion”;9 and, most recently, in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s evocation of 
an originary desiring intensity figured in their essentially occult notion of the “body 
without organs”.10  
Bergson, however, is instructive when he critiques mechanistic rationalism in 
Creative Evolution11 arguing that science, mathematics and common sense can never 
grasp the interconnected flux of the noumenal thing-in-itself beyond the phenomenal 
limits of rational cognition. For Bergson science slices the dynamic interconnected 
flux of nature into static snapshots, closed systems, which can be analysed rationally. 
And in so doing it creates an artificial, mechanistic picture of nature: a manifold series 
of still photograph-like images that Bergson claims cannot be reconnected to give a 
proper, organic, account of living reality. Yet what is remarkable is that Bergson 
informs us that this way of addressing reality was created by evolution itself: “the 
intellectual tendencies innate to-day, which life must have created in the course of its 
evolution, are not at all meant to supply us with an explanation of life: they have 
something else to do”12 and that something else is to survive in the practical world. In 
this sense Bergson accepts the Darwinian premise that evolution operates on the basis 
of practical functionality epitomised in the process of natural selection. But surely 
there is a contradiction here because according to Bergson evolution is creative. Can 
we not, therefore, posit an interconnection between reason, practical application and 
creativity?  
One can certainly argue that Bergson’s admission that rational consciousness 
is a product of evolution reveals that his critique of science is flawed because it is in 
fact possible to deconstruct specific natural phenomena and reconstruct them in a 
manner that is fully functional.13 The discovery of the genetic code, after Bergson, has 
emphasised that nature is essentially componential and combinatorial as well as being 
dynamic and interconnected.14  
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Bergson’s antagonism towards the practical-functional orientation of rational 
consciousness needs to be situated in its fin de siècle historical context in which 
postromantic thinkers were reacting against what they saw as the despiritualisation of 
society by mechanisation and utilitarianism. Bergson’s fundamental answer to this 
state of affairs is to postulate an expanded state of consciousness, akin to mystical 
experience, which is the intuition of duration, wherein one experiences the flux and 
multiplicity of phenomena thereby catching a glimpse of an interconnected dynamic 
totality. But in order to do this Bergson informs us that the “mind has to do violence 
to itself”,15 a notion that recalls Arthur Rimbaud’s recipe for creativity as a “long, 
immense and deliberate derangement of all the senses”.16  
In Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia17 the idea of altered 
consciousness is even more overt, being modelled on schizophrenia whether natural, 
or artificially induced via psychotropic chemicals.18 And their notion of the “body 
without organs” (BwO) which they characterise as the “cosmic egg”19 of life is 
appropriated from the schizophrenic surrealist Antonin Artaud. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s BwO is blatently mystical, figured as a singularity of desiring intensity that 
transcends the dimensions of space,20 an impossibility in scientific terms unless we 
think of it in terms of the singularity that initiated the Big Bang, and even then it 
becomes an essentially mystical account of creation. 
But what is valuable in Capitalism and Schizophrenia is Deleuze and 
Guattari’s recourse to chaos theory and their concept of the “machinic”. Unlike 
Nietzsche or Bergson they accept that the creativity of evolution should be understood 
in terms of the production of machines. The first volume of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, Anti-Oedipus, begins “Everywhere it is machines—real ones, not 
figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other 
machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections”.21 Machinic machines, 
however, are not ordinary machines, they are impelled by desire, by something akin to 
Bergson’s universal vital impulsion.22  
The romantic/postromantic focus on a sacred desiring force at the core of 
nature is an anthropocentric, mythopoetic construction that has no basis in science not 
even in the most counter-mechanistic science of complexity theory. Although Deleuze 
and Guattari appropriate chaos theory they do so in order to assimilate it into a poetic 
construction that is fundamentally informed by a romanticist inclination to figure 
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nature as sacred where the sacred is characterised in terms of desire, a cosmic striving 
for life diametrically opposed to the coldness of rationalistic functionalism.23  
Complexity theory, in contrast, does not entail an anthropocentric projection 
of human desire into a sacred cosmic principle. Instead complexity theory can be 
understood as a process philosophy that has no need to posit a mysterious force of 
nature because the mystery is located within complex interconnected interactions 
between a manifold of components, what one might refer to as the cosmic 
combinatoire that arises out of what Christopher Langton has called the “edge of 
chaos”.24  
The mystery of the evolution of life lies in the combinatoriality of molecules 
which in turn arise out of the combinatoriality of subatomic particles that allow the 
creation of atoms. In particular we can think of the curious lengths that molecular 
evolution had to go to in order to produce the building blocks of life that are proteins. 
Proteins are complex enfolded polymeric chains composed of amino acid sequences. 
A manifold of proteins with a vast variety of physical characteristics and biochemical 
functions can be produced from a repertoire of only twenty amino acids. But to 
produce the protein combinatoire evolution had to invent the genetic code through a 
process Christian de Duve describes as “molecular selection”.25  
Even though nature does not have foresight it is indeed a remarkable 
coincidence that when chains of nucleobases such as adenine, guanine, uracil, and 
cytosine link together they can create a template for the production of the most 
structurally complex molecules that are proteins. There may be no foresight, no 
question of actually designing the biomolecular building blocks of life, but it does 
appear that we are dealing with a remarkably serendipitous combinatoire wherein 
chance interactions between prebiotic molecules are accompanied by the promise of 
remarkable functional structures: first, proteins; second, single-celled organisms; 
third, multicellular organisms; and fourth, nervous systems and brains. 
Deleuze and Guattari use the term “double articulation” to describe the 
relationship between nucleobases and the amino acids that constitute proteins.26 
Double articulation is a term taken from semiotics which refers to the combinatorial 
nature of language wherein a finite set of sounds and syntactic rules can produce a 
manifold of combinations.27 But double articulation proliferates: language is 
composed not only of the syntagmatic dimension of phonemes and syntactic rules but 
also the paradigmatic dimension of metaphor and so we might speak of a second 
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doubling. Then we can add the dimension of speech acts which leads to third 
doubling. In addition there is the process of usage wherein language evolves 
“molecularly” as sounds alter, new words are formed and syntactic rules transform via 
mutation. The more we examine language the more levels of articulation appear: 
expanding into fractal doublings-of-doublings en abyme that evoke Feigenbaum’s 
famous diagram of period doubling;28 culture and nature intersect.  
Why and how molecular components can interconnect to create increasingly 
complex machines is currently inexplicable even by the mysterious emergence of 
attractors that enable self-organised criticality because extraordinary serendipity also 
plays a role.29 But despite such mystery to have recourse to a romantic 
anthropocentric thesis that life emerged out of a cosmic desiring impulse seems 
radically unnecessary. 
Evolution provides a model for the achievement of a synthesis between the 
practical demands of society and the postromantic demand for a poetics of the 
sublime. Evolution understood in terms of complexity theory is redolent with 
sublimity. But despite the fact that complexity theory is counter-mechanistic it does 
not replace the venerable scientific methodology of analytical reductionism; instead it 
complements it. Moreover, complexity theory is not concerned with sacralising the 
sublimity of nature in the manner of romantic and postromantic aesthetics. 
Accordingly it offers aesthetics a desacralised notion of the sublime.  
A complexity theoretical framework allows a reconciliation of  
the sublimity of evolution with the practical-functional. We can return to Bergson’s 
admission that rational analysis is the product of evolution.30 Evolutionary process is 
sublime but it is also practical-functional. As Deleuze and Guattari admit, evolution 
leads to the production of machines; but we do not have to follow their sacralisation 
of the machinic via the anthropocentric projection of human desire onto cosmic 
process.  
The chain of chance, self-organisation and natural selection that created amino 
acids, nucleobases, genetic code, proteins, single-celled then multicellular organisms 
and minds is sublime. But such sublimity does not entirely confound scientific 
rational analysis.31 Instead rational analysis, which entails rational agency and the 
capacity to intuitively and imaginatively play with ideas, can be understood as a 
component of the multidimensional space of the cosmic combinatoire,32 which can be 
related to what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the “plane of immanence”.33 
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Moreover, the acknowledgement that evolution leads to the production of 
practical-functional machines allows us to interlink natural evolution with cultural 
evolution, what Georg Lukács referred to as “second nature”, which appears to be an 
additional dimension of evolution. In a manner that resonates with the discourse of 
romanticism/postromanticism Lukács equated second nature with reification.34 But 
from an evolutionary perspective society considered as second nature need no longer 
fit into the romanticist binary opposition between nature as positive and society as 
negative if both nature and society can become considered as part of an 
interconnected combinatoire in a multidimensional phase space, akin to the “plane of 
immanence”, that offers the potential of a multiplicity of plateaus of machinic 
production.35  
With some critical modifications Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the 
machinic opens up the possibility of reconciling the thesis that is the dominant social 
discourse of functionalism with the antithesis that is the postromantic ambition to 
bring a poetics of the sublime into everyday life. The critical modification is to 
dispense with the romantic/postromantic anthropocentric projection of human desire 
onto nature. From a complexity theoretical standpoint suggesting that desire is a force 
of evolution seems both anthropocentric and anachronistic. Certainly, human desire is 
the product of the body-brain which is a product of evolution. But that does not entail 
that desire exists beyond the body-brain in the form of a Bergsonian universal 
impulsion. It is possible to reconfigure Deleuze and Guattari’s valuable concept of the 
machinic by retaining their notion of the sublimity of the machinic without figuring 
this sublimity in terms of a universal desiring impulsion such as the body without 
organs. This leads us away from hyperbolic metaphysical speculation towards a 
rapprochement between the machinic sublimity inherent in the functional orientation 
of natural evolution and its recapitulation in second nature.  
An evolutionary aesthetics that relinquishes the romantic/postromantic 
prejudice against the practical-functional is in a position to re-establish the historic 
liaison between art and design. The question that can be posed at the end of this 
discussion is whether we can imagine an evolutionary aesthetics informed by 
scientific fields such as complexity theory and connectionism that preserves a sense of 
the sublime without denigrating practicality? A reconfigured version of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s machinic aesthetics that reconciles sublimity with functionality might be as 
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successful in bringing art into life as was the machine aesthetic in the first half of the 
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